Journal X
Volume 5
Number 1 Autumn 2000/Spring 2001

Article 8

2001

Sovereign Pleasures
Jayne Lewis
University of California, Los Angeles

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx
Part of the Comparative Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
Lewis, Jayne (2001) "Sovereign Pleasures," Journal X: Vol. 5 : No. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol5/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Studies in English at eGrove. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal X by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please contact
egrove@olemiss.edu.

Lewis: Sovereign Pleasures

Sovereign Pleasures
Jayne Lewis

Jayne Lewis is Profes
sor ofEnglish at the
University of Califor
nia, Los Angeles. Her
most recent book is
Mary Queen of
Scots: Romance and
Nation (Routledge,
1998). Her son, Peter,
recently learned to say
“please.”

Published by eGrove, 2001

I’ve always taken pleasure in anything lucid, solitary,
spare: the arm cleaving clear water, the one hawk in
blue heaven. Now that I have this baby, though, what
offers itself up for joy is mysterious and curved. It
almost utterly shared. I wonder therefore if the fac
ulty of pleasure is the absolute I always thought it
was, or if its shape and meaning mutate with the
objects available to it. This is not the same thing, by
the way, as wondering if pleasure is Historically Con
structed, which everything and nothing is,
why
ask.
It’s more that we almost need to be pleased.
Hobbes thought so, observing in Leviathan that
"pleasure seemeth to be a corroboration of vitall
motion, and a help thereunto.” I like this notion of
corroboration, as if pleasure somehow approves of our
creaturely animation, permits it. As if we would do
well to befriend pleasure, so that it will give us its
help. It’s evidently in our interest to provide the plea
sure principle with as many different subjects as pos
sible. That way we stand a chance of getting all the
help we need.
We need a lot. I knew someone who was in love
with someone. The two of them studied the same
language, and the same problems, and once one of
them — the one I knew — checked out a library
book on that language and its problems. When she
opened the book, out slipped a postcard from Venice
or someplace twisted and ravishing and malevolent
like that. This postcard was addressed to a woman
she knew very slightly in the unfortunate handwrit
ing of the man she was in love with. On the front
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were two hands clasped, a detail from some infinitely bigger canvas, and on the
other side was one word, which was please. You should be able to interpret that
word in a lot of different ways, but really you cant. Really, the implications are
crystal clear, and not pleasing unless the word please is addressed to you. Plea
sure in general has this element of supplication. There is a power differential
in it: something is given and received. Anyone pleased lordly.
So there was John Milton, radical republican, putting pleasure at the cen
ter of Paradise Lost, and in the most surprising ways. God, for example, when
answering the rhetorical question of why he made Adam et al. free admits he
did that for his own pleasure. In turn, human sovereignty is expressed through
enjoyment. In the unspoiled paradise the one adjective you come across over
and over again
“sweet.” Here is Milton the radical republican saying
nonetheless that pleasure is a divine right, an absolute of human being.
Just as he was saying this, they were, if paradoxically, seeing pleasure very
differently in the court of Charles II. This court was notoriously sybaritic to
say the least, a garden of priapic splendor if you believe the myth, all emanat
ing from the lazy, cunning king at its center. Yet people there seem to have
regarded pleasure the way Milton should have, given his mistrust of kings and
lust and anything pretty. For one thing, they did not especially believe in it.
The most imperfect of courtly enjoyers, the earl of Rochester, for example held
that it’s easy to “tak[e] false pleasure for true love / But pain can ne’er deceive.”
Whereas for Milton the capacity to be pleased confirms autonomy with all its
powers and obligations, Rochester proposed that really pleasure subjugates,
producing illusions that only pain dismantles. If you are interested in the truth,
you want at least to be the pleaser, not the pleased, and it’s better yet to be out
of it altogether.
This isn’t the middle of the seventeenth century of course; it’s barely the
beginning of the twenty-first, and absolute sovereignty is more or less a thing
of the past, as are perhaps the forms of enjoyment that bothered Rochester.
Also, fewer and fewer postcards are falling out of books. Fewer and fewer
books are being opened in the first place. Instead, most words are flickering
through cyberspace, moth-like but more cynical than moths, less questing.
There’s nothing for anything to latch on to, which could get to be a problem for
pleasure, seeing as how always before it seemed to work like a lock and key,
needing something notched and unique to fit into a shape that was already
there somehow, commanding its own contents.
I’ve noticed more and more keys disappearing from my life. For instance,
I have an alarm system built into my car. If I am outside the car but want to be
inside it, I am compelled to press a button on my keychain. I do that and there
is a little yelp and then the car unlocks itself but there is no pleasurable grind
ing slide of a key’s teeth, no twist of the wrist or jolt the lock springing up,
released. There’s no pleasure. The car’s yielding feels arbitrary,
if I just hap
pened to be walking by when it decided to make itself available. Recently, how
ever, the baby was playing with my keychain and he must have jiggled some
thing loose because the last time I pressed the button on my keyless key
absolutely nothing happened. The car sat still for a change, and it was good, if
somewhat inconvenient.
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Like most babies, mine has his own set of keys, colored plastic ones that he
likes all right, but the jingle of the real ones, or maybe their weight, pleases him
more. In this case, his pleasure has given mine back to me, and I am humbled
by his largesse, accidental though it is. In their way, his pleasures happen like
accidents too. I do watch him laying down certain laws of liking. Yet at first it
seems that objects fall to him by chance and then he will or wont piece them
into some jigsaw of affection and, ultimately, desire. It’s impossible to say
which comes first, the pleasure or the thing that gives it. It’s impossible to say
if the baby is freed or bound when he learns to command this and not that —
the banana and not the applesauce, the dragonfly and not the duck, The Snowy
Day and never, never Good Night Moon, though (because?) he has five copies of
it. I cannot tell if with age he is growing imperious or cowed, and if cowed
whether it is by the brute force of his own pleasure or by the objects that pro
voke and thereby seem to govern it.
Yet pleasure is supposed to be a primal motive; from Freud’s point of view,
it is an absolute motive, or at least it was until, as for Adam et al., the death
drive made its despotic ambitions known. Jeremy Bentham was really much
less compromising in his Principles of Morals and Legislation, where even the
most malign instincts boil down to pleasure: “Let a man’s motive be ill-will; call
it even malice, envy, cruelty; it is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive; the
pleasure he takes at the thought of the pain which he sees, or expects to see, his
adversary undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure, taken by itself is good. It
may be faint; it may be short; it must at any rate be impure; yet while it lasts,
and before any bad consequences arrive, it is as good as any other that is not
more intense.”
There’s much to interest us in this particular principle of morals and legis
lation, but one thing is the question of what makes pleasure, even wretched
pleasure, “good.” What seems to do that is its discreteness, its detachment
from “consequence.” It is as if any consequence, good or bad, would make the
pleasure itself less good. The other thing that makes pleasure good is its inten
sity. In either case, pleasure is pure lyric. Narrative seduces and adulterates it.
No more sweet paradise with the walls around it. Everyone: learn to say please.
So back to pleasure and the question of what it might or might not have to
do with history. With personal history, the troublesome skein of redundancy
and change, incursion and obduracy. With narrative history, the chain of con
sequences from which we don’t know how to deliver ourselves and yet per
versely reckon an affirmation of our freedom. With history history, the fath
omless sea of particularities where the people who enjoy themselves the most
just drown, as witness the House of Stuart, or Marie Antoinette, or poor
Princess Di just when by all accounts she was happy at last. In general, histo
ry seems inimical to pleasure, which requires stately domes and the instant the
red currant bursts on the tongue. And suspense,
in the infinite pause at the
top of the ferris wheel. Even when there is a whole piece of music, joy gathers
to a point, a summit, perilous and absolute. You can plot it on a map, some
how, but not in sentences.
Before the baby was born I went swimming almost every day, at once sin
gular and accompanied. I’m an earth sign who has trouble with liquids, but this
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was my first true and absolute maternal pleasure, the water one great hand lift
ing and molding me, patiently erasing the difference between the me and the
not-me. The sun browned my back, beating a white H in the place where my
suit straps went, and the baby would rest in the effortfill peace of my swim
ming. Two weeks after he was born I went back to the water, assuming it would
bless me, but instead I found myself floundering there, lonely and cold. I drift
ed like an empty sack, unsaved and clumsy, my grace gone.
So I turned back to my books, and to authors no one pays me to study: Tol
stoy and Margery Allingham. Janet Frame. There’s world of pleasure in these
books, the pleasure of vicarious life. I hadn’t thought I would need the vicari
ous now, with my own life suddenly so present and full, so this is a source of
pleasure worth looking into. What for that matter is vicarious pleasure? Is it
imaginatively experiencing the pleasures that others — even unreal others —
take in reality, or is it taking pleasure in what happens to others, regardless of
whether they themselves are pleased? Is it that someone else your substitute,
your vicar, in the stately pleasure dome?
Vicarious pleasure seems at first to have something to do with standing
back, apart, at that chaste, absolute point that the solstice of history. Except
vicis means alternation, or change, so that if you are going to be true to the
word vicarious (and why wouldn’t you?) you have to think about there being in
the purity of pleasure like that some sudden undulation,
of clean grass as a
shape passes through it.
There’s an ethical thread in this that is hard but important to pluck apart
from the problem of definition. It has to do with what pleasure permits us to
be to each other, its place in relations of power. Here is where you have to bring
pain back into the picture, as a point of contrast. Vicarious pain, that is, oth
erwise known as sympathy. It confirms your talent for substituting yourself for
another, at least imaginatively, and from there becomes the ground of kindness,
of intervention in the unjust business of the world. Vicarious pleasure is some
how more sinister; its seeker seems starved, but righteously so, haughty and
immaculate and selfish. The thing is that pleasure of this sort, vicarious sensa
tion of this sort, would never prod you to do anything. The opposite: it would
suspend you like Mary Poppins’s giggly uncle forever pouring tea up in the
eaves.
And yet. It ought to be possible merely to respect the pleasures of others
without concerning yourself in them in any way. This would be a good, in exact
contrast to the way in which it’s a good to concern yourself in the pain of oth
ers (short of being the one to inflict it, of course). I understand that the idea
of such a good occurred to Rebecca West: “If we do not live for pleasure we
shall soon find ourselves living for pain. If we do not regard as sacred our own
joys and the joys of others, we open the door and let into life the ugliest
attribute of the human race, which is cruelty.” That’s stark, and pleasingly
Hobbesian, albeit portentous of a world more liberal than the one Hobbes envi
sioned.
The woman I knew, the one who found the postcard, held it in her hand
and thought what shall I do. The thing is, until that moment her love affair
had given her nothing but pleasure. She had been pleasingly drowsy all the
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while, whereas for the rest of her life (which had been going on for a long time
by then) she had had to keep her brain wakeful, flooded with light. With this
man she thought she could lie still and even sink. And all the while she had
been taking false pleasure for true love, perhaps even mistaking for pleasure
something radically different from it. All the while, the man who had been her
bed, her dim room, her quiet house, was thinking please, and writing that very
word, and mailing it secretly to someone else while travelling in Italy. It was
someone else and not she who could please him, yet the survival of her own
pleasure now demanded the denial of his. It now required the other woman to
say no or nothing at all. As it did seem she had done, choosing to see his plea
as nothing more than a tool, a means of marking a page she liked.
Even when pleasure
not essential, it is essential to what is essential.
What is essential is some sense of self-rule. But the inessential what pro
duces that sense. Georges Bataille worked this out in considerable detail,
somewhat predictably identifying sovereignty ancient and modern with the
powers of consumption, indulgence, and excess. “The sovereign, if he
not
imaginary, truly enjoys the products of this world — beyond his needs. His
sovereignty resides in this. Let us say that the sovereign (or the sovereign life)
begins when, with the necessities ensured, the possibility of life opens up with
out limit. Conversely, we may call sovereign the enjoyment of possibilities that
utility doesn’t justify. [. . . ] Life beyond utility is the domain of sovereignty.”
Enjoyment here subsists beyond need, which is where sovereignty is too. We
are back to the power of pleasure, or at least to the way that enjoyment affirms
prerogative, one’s place above and beyond. Bataille qualifies this, however, by
speaking of “the sovereign, if he not imaginary.” What sovereign today not
imaginary? Who can forget the pop psych trope of the inner child, who was
basically the inner tyrant, and most decidedly imaginary? To the imaginary
sovereign, enjoyment
rooted not in excess but in virtual necessity, in that
Hobbesian assistance to our own vitality.
When the woman I knew showed her lover the postcard she’d found, he
didn’t deny having sent it. He did not do anything like that. Still she left it to
him to say whether he thought she should go on loving him or not. “It’s not
that you don’t please me,” he said. When he said it she realized that it wasn’t
that. It was more that she had never known him to have done anything remote
ly
playful as what he had done when he’d sent that postcard. In her mind,
this turned out to be more decisive than the question of who had the power to
please whom — though of course play and pleasure and power all converge in
the end.
They do this because they did it in the beginning. In 1970 D.W. Winnicott, an expert in child’s play, was wondering why people (or at least English
people) like having kings, and queens. He thought it had to do with the per
manence of monarchy, with the way kings — like the indestructible object of a
child’s play — have the power to survive the buffets of love and fury and all the
other primitive passions. By surviving like that, sovereign figures organize “the
paradox that links exterior reality with inner experience.” And this organiza
tion is a great pleasure, for what is being organized is the relationship between
the accidental and the determinate. Eventually words attempt to do the orga
nizing for us, but it’s never quite the same.
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Speaking of words, the linguist Elinor Ochs was interested in baby talk, the
high-pitched ska I’ve mastered pretty well by now She found that mothers the
world over do not talk to their babies in this tone of voice. As a matter of fact,
in some places such
Samoa you hear it only when adults are speaking to their
superiors. The elevated singsong placates, appeases. It gives a pleasure that
protects the speaker from lordly wrath. In the interest of democracy, I did for
a day or two try to speak to the baby in a level alto and in sentences that didn’t
rhyme. But it was really much too hard: the family with a baby is the last bas
tion of absolute monarchy.
In fact, babies are the final refuge of the absolute, period. So much that has
been lost from the rest of the world, for better or for worse, hiding out there
behind the Stevie Wonder smile. Actually, my particular baby has an amazing
smile, focused and radiant and recognizing. Nothing pleases me more than this
smile.
In sum? Clearly there is no arithmetic of pleasure which might yield an
actual sum. There may be a geometry, but not one expressible in a series of
proofs. All I wanted to ask was what you can learn about pleasure by having a
baby around. What can you learn by observing both the baby and your rela
tionship to him? What I’ve learned is that pleasure survives its own alienation,
and possibly even thrives on it. Also I have learned that enjoyment is primal,
but not
much as you might think. It’s a power born of subjection, ours to
what already there. The subjection comes first, and then the sovereign plea
sure. Babies are tyrants. They demand to be pleased, but only because they can
do nothing else. It’s a relief to know this. It’s liberating in its
Here are some sovereign pleasures, as specific as they are not: my mouth
on the baby’s warm belly, blowing. Eucalyptus leaves spilling some of the sun
on his face. Our deep chair in darkness. There are really no words for any of
these pleasures, but that possibly is how, and why, they can bind us into a com
mon good.
I saw a woman recently. She was bobbing up and down at the shallow end
of a swimming pool and in front of her, on the deck, was a stroller, its hood
down at an angle that, frankly, recalled the bassinet in Rosemary’s Baby. Any
way, from her place waist deep in water this woman was looking up and pour
ing baby talk into the space under the hood. Then a man who must have been
her partner came and wheeled the baby back. I watched the woman watch
them go, grateful and aggrieved. After that she turned and struck out through
the water, her arms bright, her legs lost in ight as she swam.
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